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David Doyle, University of Oxford
Nina Wiesehomeier, IE School of International RelationsPresidents play a central role in legislative activity in Latin America. Previous research highlights that some form of ideo-
logical compromise on behalf of the president is vital to sustain successful legislative coalitions. Yet, primarily due to the
lack of a ﬁrm empirical basis on which to measure such presidential give-and-take, the extent to which presidents make
use of such policy compromise, and under what conditions this is a viable strategy, remains unknown. Applying quan-
titative text analysis to 305 annual “state of the union” addresses of 73 presidents in 13 Latin American countries, we
remedy this situation and provide comparable time-series data for Latin American presidential movements in a one-
dimensional issue space between 1980 and 2014. Our results indicate that presidents will compromise in response to
changes in the median party, although this effect will be mediated by the institutional context within which the pres-
ident operates.Just over three decades ago Linz (1990) warned of thedangers of presidentialism. For Linz and others (e.g.,Stepan and Skach 1993), the apparent fragility of presi-
dential democracies relative to parliamentary systems is rooted
in the psychological incentives that stem from the direct elec-
tion and ﬁxed term of the presidential ofﬁce, which are thought
to foster an imperial and intolerant governing style among
presidents and to remove the incentive for compromise and
coalition building. This will cultivate conﬂict between the
executive and legislative branches, particularly in minority
government situations, resulting in legislative deadlock and,
eventually, democratic breakdown (Maeda 2010; Mainwaring
1993).
The past 30 years have demonstrated, however, that leg-
islative deadlock between both branches of government in
presidential systems is far from the norm, inspiring exten-
sive revisionist interpretations of executive-legislative relations
in separation of power systems. For example, recent work sug-
gests that coalitions are a regular feature of multiparty pres-
idential systems (Cheibub et al. 2004) and a common means
to secure successful legislative outcomes (Alemán and Tsebelis
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms as presidents will bargain—both through material resources
and through informal channels—to ensure that policy is passed
(Abranches 1988; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Figueiredo and
Limongi 2000; Mejía Acosta 2009). An implicit assumption in
much of this work is that some form of ideological compromise
on behalf of the president is an integral part of the legislative
process (Amorim Neto 2002; Colomer and Negretto 2005;
Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010).
Indeed, for Cox and Morgenstern (2001, 171), the actions of
the president are conditioned by the threat of legislative veto,
and so at times “they make policy concessions as a part of their
overall strategy to get their way.”
However, aside from anecdotal accounts about speciﬁc
presidents and particular policy issues or from work on pol-
icy switching in the immediate aftermath of a presidential
election (e.g., Stokes 2001), we still have no systematic com-
parative understanding of when, and to what degree, the ex-
ecutive in presidential systems is willing to compromise. Un-
derstanding this dynamic is directly related to the wider issue
of governance and subsequent policy outcomes (see Saiegh
2009a, 1342). Although the assumption that presidents will
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remains undertheorized, primarily due to a lack of compa-
rable data.
We address both issues in this paper. First, we contribute
to the revisionist literature on executive-legislative relations
(e.g., Amorim Neto 2002; Colomer and Negretto 2005; Cox
and Morgenstern 2001; Raile et al. 2010) by providing an
explicit theoretical account of the dynamics that undergird
a president’s willingness to compromise her policy position.
We argue that the president does not adopt a static policy po-
sition across her term. Rather, the president, if she wishes to
pursue a statutory legislative agenda, will respond to shifting
dynamics in the house. Speciﬁcally, given the importance of
the median party for such a statutory strategy, we contend
that when the position of the median party changes, the pres-
ident will shift her policy position in the same direction. When
the president compromises her position in response to the
median party in this manner, the president will enjoy a higher
rate of success for her legislative initiatives than were she not
to do so. The results of our empirical tests provide support
for this assertion. Of course not all presidents will wish or
need to compromise, and we expect that there will be no-
table heterogeneity to this dynamic. Indeed, our results show
that the president’s willingness to respond to the median party
will depend on the president’s nonstatutory power, her gov-
ernment status, and her ability to offset the need for com-
promise with increased material transfers.
Second, we address the current lack of adequate data. One
of the primary obstacles toward a better understanding of
these dynamics has been—to date—the difﬁculty of deriving
reliable comparable estimates of the policy compromise of
presidents over time. We understand executive policy com-
promise as positional ﬂexibility on behalf of the president,
which translates into presidential movement along a one-
dimensional issue axis. Using the scaling model Wordﬁsh (Sla-
pin and Proksch 2008) within a Bayesian framework, we es-
timate ideal points of 73 Latin American presidents on the
basis of their strategically revealed positions in their annual
state of the union addresses between 1980 and 2014.1 The re-
sulting data allow us to derive time-series data for presi-
dential movements in a one-dimensional issue space, calcu-
lating the shift in policy positioning as the difference between
apresident’s estimated position between time t21 and time t.1. Across Latin American countries, these types of speeches are named
differently, such asMemoria del Gobierno, Informe del Gobierno—both trans-
latable into “government report,” Informe Presidencial (presidential report),
or Estado de la Nación, the most equivalent to the state of the union address.
Given that they serve an identical purpose across all countries, for the sake
of simplicity, we will use the term “state of the union address” throughout this
paper.
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as a means to derive reliable and comparable ex post posi-
tional estimates for political actors over time and to provide
the ﬁrst comparable standardized measures of presiden-
tial movement across time and space for 13 Latin American
countries. This is not only of interest to the literature con-
cerned with measuring the policy positions of political actors
across Latin America (Coppedge 1997; Micozzi and Kikuchi
2015; PELA 2005; Power and Zucco 2009; Saiegh 2009b;
Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009); it is particularly pertinent
for studies of executive-legislative relations in a region where
progress in scholarship is often hampered by data availabil-
ity. Indeed, Latin America represents a difﬁcult test for com-
promise: Latin American presidents are often caricatured as
all powerful and imperial, and the region continues to suffer
fromhigh levels of presidential instability (Pérez-Liñán 2007).
In many ways, the continent appears to continue to echo
Linz’s argument.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next two sections outline our main theoretical argument re-
garding the willingness of the executive in presidential sys-
tems to compromise her policy position. The fourth section
introduces our method for estimating the policy positions
of presidents and presents the annual position and relative
movement of presidents in Argentina (1990–2014), Brazil
(1986–2014), Chile (1990–2013), Colombia (1991–2013),
Costa Rica (1983–2013), Ecuador (1982–2012), El Salvador
(1995–2013), Guatemala (1999–2014), Mexico (1989–2013),
Paraguay (1992–2011), Peru (1980–2013), Uruguay (2001–
12), and Venezuela (1987–2014). The ﬁfth section empirically
explores the determinants of presidential movement across
these 13 countries. The ﬁnal section concludes.
EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR POLICY SHIFTS
While there is a large literature focusing on the adaption of
party policy positions in response to public opinion (Adams,
Haupt, and Stoll 2009), changing economic circumstances
(Luna and Zechmeister 2005), the increasing salience of va-
lence issues (Laver and Sergenti 2011), and the stickiness
of party positions due to the nature of the party (Cox 1990)
or electoral system (Dow 2001), surprisingly little work has
focused on the movement of presidential policy positions.
Evidence suggests, for single-country studies at least, that just
like political parties, presidents may be responsive to pub-
lic opinion and the electoral cycle (Calvo 2007). In the case
of Latin America, presidents have radically changed their
policy position in response to economic circumstances; this
is best documented by the dramatic policy turns of newly
elected presidents in the early 1990s (see Campello 2014;
Kaplan 2013; Samuels and Shugart 2010; Stokes 2001).254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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with explaining the ideological reorientation of the president
in the immediate aftermath of a presidential election. But, just
like political parties, presidents may experience similar in-
centives to adjust policy priorities throughout their time in
ofﬁce. Indeed, for a large portion of the revisionist compar-
ative literature, which rejects the pessimism inherent in early
interpretations of presidentialism, the ability of presidents
to craft coalitions in support of their legislative agenda is
not just solely about the distribution of cabinet seats (e.g.,
Amorim Neto 2006), or informal channels of negotiation (e.g.,
Mejía Acosta 2009), or the selective transfer of pork at key
legislative moments (e.g., Raile et al. 2010), but also involves
policy compromise with the legislature (e.g., Amorim Neto
2002; Cheibub 2007; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Raile et al.
2010). Apart from some seminal work on the incentives for
policy compromise during the process of coalition formation
(Cheibub 2007; Colomer and Negretto 2005), we lack a com-
parative theoretical understanding of when and why a presi-
dent will or will not compromise with the House throughout
the course of her term in ofﬁce. It is this gap that we address
in the next section.
PRESIDENTS AND POLICY COMPROMISE
Given the separation of powers, independently elected pres-
idents may not be bound to policy platforms held by their
own party (Johnson and Crisp 2003; Wiesehomeier and Benoit
2009). As such, the independent preferences of presidents are
crucial for policy making (Cheibub 2007; Kiewit and McCub-
bins 1991), and party positions and ideological cues from
elections may poorly predict the policy priorities that pres-
idents will adopt once in ofﬁce. We argue that presidents in
Latin American multi-party systems will adapt their policy
position throughout the course of their term in response to
the dynamic interplay of executive-legislative relations.2
We assume that the primary goal of the president is to
govern, that is, to successfully enact policy (see Alemán and
Tsebelis 2011; Saiegh 2009a, 1342), and, depending on her gov-
ernment status, she may have to build cross-assembly support
to ensure the success of her legislative agenda (Alemán and
Tsebelis 2011; Cheibub et al. 2004; Colomer and Negretto 2005;
Negretto 2006). Presidential bargaining, both through mate-
rial resources—such as the distribution of pork—and policy
compromise, is thus essential, and it is the choices a presi-
dent makes while in power that “foretell presidential success
or failure [and that] . . . matter a great deal” (Samuels 2008,
164). Therefore, presidents may ﬁnd themselves confronted2. As Cox and Morgenstern (2001) note, legislators will also adapt their
position in response to the president.
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compromise their policy position in order to build support
among legislators and to realize policy objectives.
We start with the assumption that the president has a
preferred policy position on an underlying policy dimension,
such as the traditional left-right axis, and that she seeks to
improve the status quo of policy in line with her own pref-
erences (see Strøm 1990). We also assume that the prefer-
ences of legislative parties as a whole can be located on this
policy space. Once a president assumes ofﬁce, she must re-
veal a policy position in the political arena. This displayed
position will depend on her strategy, which will in turn de-
pend on her own preferences, the preferences of others in the
legislative arena, and the institutional context in which these
actors interact. One of the choices presidents have to make
when they come to power is to decide on a governing strat-
egy, pursuing either a statutory strategy through the normal
legislative process or an extra-legislative strategy through the
exercise of unilateral legislative powers such as decrees (e.g.,
Carey and Shugart 1998).3 As Amorim Neto and Samuels
(2011) point out, each of these strategies involves political
parties to differing degrees, and thereby they also create dif-
ferent incentives for the executive to build relationships with
legislative parties and to take into consideration the interests
of legislators. Although independent from the legislature, pres-
idents must engender majority support within the House if
they are to succeed with a statutory legislative agenda. In this
scenario, the median party along the policy space becomes
crucial for policy making, as it represents the threshold for
a legislative majority (Colomer and Negretto 2005, 77–78).
Therefore, when the president assumes ofﬁce, she will display
a policy position that considers the assembly median, even
though this position may or may not be her preferred ideo-
logical position (Cheibub 2007; Colomer and Negretto 2005).4
Indeed, Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) show that the me-
dian party in the legislature forms a focal point to which a
president’s position tends to be drawn.
However, what happens if during the course of a presi-
dent’s term the median party changes? For example, mid-term
legislative elections might signiﬁcantly alter the composition
of the assembly or legislators may be wooed to a different
party and cross the ﬂoor. If the president wishes to pursue
her statutory policy-making agenda and achieve policy vic-
tories, then she must rebuild a legislative coalition and nar-will, of course, employ some mix of both.
4. It is simply not possible to ascertain the president’s true preferred
position. Election manifestos may provide some clues, but they will be writ-
ten in response to electoral incentives.
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position. By shifting her policy position and considering the
new median party position, she can signal to legislators that
she is willing to accommodate their positions, enabling the
president to begin the process of reconstructing a legislative
coalition in support of her agenda.5 In other words, antici-
pating the increased risk of policy conﬂict (Cox and Mor-
genstern 2001), shifting the policy position in response to the
median party may be an effective means for a president to in-
crease support for her policy goals, resulting in higher rates
of statutory legislative success. Therefore, all else equal:
H1. When the median party changes, the president
will move in the direction of this new median.
Yet, this is not to say that the median party will be a policy
dictator. Rather, the pull of the median party in the legislature
will be mediated by factors related to a president’s inherent,
that is institutional, and political strengths, and we therefore
expect to observe a signiﬁcant systematic heterogeneity to this
effect. As pointed out before, the institutional context in which
the actors operate will foster or dampen presidential incen-
tives for positional shifts. Some presidents in Latin America,
for instance, enjoy considerable unilateral institutional prerog-
atives. Strong presidents may therefore not have the need to
shift their position—their agenda-setting power may override
the need to compromise their preferred position in the ﬁrst
place (see Negretto 2004). As they will have the ability to cir-
cumvent the legislature and pursue an extra-legislative strat-
egy, presidents who have the cards stacked in their favor do
not have to rely on negotiating with the median party (con-
taining the median legislator) to see their policy goals achieved.
In other words, presidents with a favorable balance of power
will be more prone to adapting an imperial governing strategy
(Cox andMorgenstern 2001).6What is more, when a president
has high levels of executive power at her disposal, this may
even entice legislators to move toward the president to neu-
tralize the threat of an extra-institutional legislative strategy.
Therefore:5. Additionally, as Raile et al. (2010) argue, even in an environment
where ideology is less important, it should still contribute to stability in
legislative support for the executive.
6. This reasoning is akin to the impact of the balance of institutional
power on a president’s proclivity to form coalition governments (Alemán
and Tsebelis (2011)), which of course also implies bargaining about pol-
icies. However, Samuels (2003) suggests that even when presidents can act
unilaterally, they may refrain from doing so. Instead, they attempt to ex-
plicitly link legislators to national policy as a means of spreading the re-
sponsibility for national governance, thereby reducing their own account-
ability to the electorate.
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president to shift her displayed policy position less in
response to changes in the median party relative to pres-
idents with weaker powers.
Equally, we expect that political factors that pertain to
the president will weaken the presidential drift toward the
legislative median. Recent comparative work on executive-
legislative relations in presidential systems, particularly for the
Latin American case, has emphasized the importance of the
transfer of particularistic beneﬁts, together with cabinet and
public sector goods, to individual legislators and coalition part-
ners, in order to build and maintain support for the exec-
utive’s legislative agenda (Ames 2001; Amorim Neto 2002;
Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Raile et al. 2010). Pork can be ex-
changed in return for votes and can help “overcome ideo-
logical resistance in generating legislative support” (Raile et al.
2010, 324). In this way, the transfer of material resources can
offset the need for the president to compromise her policy
position, enabling her to remain closer to her preferred po-
sition in the policy space. Hence, if the executive has the re-
sources to engage in spending to secure necessary votes to
push through her policies, then there should be less of a re-
quirement for her to signal policy ﬂexibility to the median
party. Therefore:
H3. At high levels of targeted material transfers, we
expect the president to shift her displayed policy po-
sition less in response to changes in the median party
relative to lower levels of targeted transfers.
Presidents can also derive political strength from the sep-
arate election of the executive; for Linz (1990), in fact, this is
one of the key dangers of presidentialism. As directly elected
representatives of the nation, presidents may be able to claim
to speak directly for the people, thereby claiming a “demo-
cratic, even plebiscitarian legitimacy” (Linz 1990, 53). Not only
may this give rise to populism, particularly in contexts where
the electorate may have little faith in existing institutions or
parties (e.g., Doyle 2011), but when a president is very popular
among the public, it may also allow her to ignore changes in
the preferences of the legislature because these shifts do not
truly represent the preferences of “the people.” Indeed, evi-
dence suggests that high public approval ratings can increase
the bargaining power of the executive and bolster her legis-
lative agenda (Calvo 2007; Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo
2014; Martínez-Gallardo 2011). In a similar vein, the honey-
moon period may empower a newly inaugurated executive
and lessen the incentive to accommodate her position as she
carries the most recent popular mandate (Alemán and Navia254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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Therefore:
H4. At high levels of popular approval, we expect the
president to shift her displayed policy position less in
response to changes in the median party relative to
lower levels of popular approval.
H5. During the honeymoon period, we expect the
president to shift her displayed policy position less in
response to changes in the median party.
Finally, as the comparative literature has also well estab-
lished, the partisan power of the president will be crucial for
interbranch bargaining (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). When
a president assumes power, she will either have a single-party
majority, a single-party minority, or some form of minority
or majority coalition. In general, we would expect presidents
with a majority to move less relative to presidents with a mi-
nority. Yet, while a majority coalition does contain the me-
dian party, contrary to the situation of a single-party majority,
a coalition legislative median may change, inducing presiden-
tial adjustment. For minority executives, our expectations are
even less clear. On the one hand, it is possible that we see less
positional ﬂexibility for a minority executive because we are
observing a case in which policy differences are large. In this
scenario, policy compromise may simply be too costly for
the president (Diermeier 2006), resulting in a minority gov-
ernment opposed by a hostile majority and “no one can do
anything about it” (Cheibub et al. 2004, 566). Alternatively,
a minority government may indicate an executive who opted
against the formation of a long-term coalition, preferring in-
stead to either set policies unilaterally or to form ad hoc al-
liances to enact her legislative agenda (Alemán and Tsebelis
2011; Cheibub et al. 2004; Negretto 2006). Consequently,
we do not formulate clear directional hypotheses for govern-
ment type but leave it open to empirical investigation.7 The
next section will discuss the data we use to explore our prop-
ositions empirically.
MEASURING THE POLICY POSITIONS OF PRESIDENTS
Previous work estimating policy positions of political actors
in Latin America has relied on a variety of sources, such as7. We do acknowledge that there are of course additional factors that
will affect the incentives of presidents to alter their revealed preference,
such as economic crises (Stokes 2001). Here we just focus on the incentives
for policy compromise generated by interbranch interaction.
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or country electoral polls), elite surveys (e.g., PELA 2005;
Power and Zucco 2009), and expert surveys (e.g., Coppedge
1997; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). While most of these
efforts have focused on political parties, only a few of them
consider the president as a self-contained actor and measure
presidential positions separately (PELA 2005, Power and
Zucco 2014; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). However, even
if they do, the data provided has limited temporal scope and
only offers information about a single point in time, the
position of the incumbent president at the time the respec-
tive survey was conducted.
Retrieving a time-series of presidential policy preferences
via a survey instrument ex post may potentially be problem-
atic as the responses may suffer from a temporal anchoring
problem (see Saiegh 2009b). Another possibility to learn about
elite policy preferences is the analysis of voting patterns in
congress (Alemán and Saiegh 2007; Ames 2001; Carey 2008;
Micozzi and Kikuchi 2015; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Yet
roll calls are often called upon for strategic purposes, which
may introduce bias in any inference based on this data. In
addition, presidents do not take votes in the legislature, which
renders roll calls of limited use to determine the executive’s
policy preferences independently from that of her political
party.
We overcome these empirical obstacles and present the
ﬁrst time series of presidential ideal points for 13 Latin Amer-
ican countries. We derive policy positions on the basis of the
president’s annual speech to congress about the current state
of affairs. Like any other political actor, presidents express pol-
icy preferences through text. They aim at conveying a mes-
sage, and consequently they reveal policy positions in speeches
and written statements.
Using text offers one key advantage over alternative means:
text and speech documents can always be analyzed ex post.
Any revealed position can be retrieved for extended time pe-
riods, going further back into the past. Party election mani-
festos are a well-known data source in this respect (see Budge
2001), but increasingly scholars are also making use of other
sources, such as government speeches (Brier and Hopp 2011;
Klemmensen, Hobolt, and Hansen 2007) or legislative speeches
(Hakhverdian 2009) to retrieve positional information on
political actors. In the Latin American context, Murillo (2007),
for instance, analyzes the speeches of presidents in Costa Rica,
while Sagarzazu (2011) examines Brazilian legislative speeches.
Thus, measuring the latent displayed policy positions of pres-
idents with the help of computerized text analysis, we re-
trieve reliable data to calculate the presidents’ movement in
the issue space.254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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The texts we use to estimate annual presidential positional
data are presidents’ annual state of the union addresses.8 The
delivery of this speech is highly institutionalized. Across all
13 countries included in our study, the constitution deter-
mines that the executive is required to periodically inform
the congress about the country’s situation. The primary tar-
get audience in these different national settings is the same:
while these speeches may address noninstitutional actors such
as the electorate, presidents will above all seek the support
of legislators.9 It is an opportunity to garner support for the
executive’s course of action across all salient policy areas and
to appeal to the median party. Given that these speeches are
delivered annually, they enable us to capture this signaling by
tracking positional movement over time.
Table 1 summarizes our sample of 305 speeches given
by 73 presidents in 13 Latin American countries. In most
instances, the ﬁrst year of observation refers to the year of
re-democratization of the respective country. In the case of
Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Uruguay, and Venezuela, the time period covered in our sam-
ple is restricted due to data availability. For Mexico, our
observation period begins with the year 1989, as that year
is considered to be the start of the nonauthoritarian regime
(Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). In the case of Peru, we
exclude the period of Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup from our
analysis.
While the more recent documents could often be retrieved
from ofﬁcial websites of the executive or the legislature, older
speeches only existed as physical documents in the respec-
tive national archives. We transform all documents into a
machine-readable format, relying on digitized sources where
possible and scanning all hard-copies where necessary. To
prepare the speeches for further analyses, we remove stop-
words, special characters, and numbers, and we reduce the
words to their stems. We count the occurrence of each word
stem in each document and then build term-document ma-
trices for each country.
Table 1 also highlights key characteristics of the texts for
each country corpus. State of the union addresses in Brazil,
Guatemala, and Uruguay stand out for being the shortest on
average—we count only 1,650.76, 822.31, and 1,722.00 word
stems, respectively. On the opposite end, we ﬁnd the pres-
idential addresses in Chile (7,792.38) and Venezuela (9,955.52)8. It is important to note that the topics covered by the president in
these speeches can also be strategic at times.
9. Unlike in the case of the United States, in Latin America, in only a
small number of countries is the president’s speech televised.
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these speeches indicate that the within-country variation gen-
erally does not reach high levels, the exception being Vene-
zuela, driven by the late Hugo Chávez. The median relative
frequency of the words allows us to get a snapshot of the
most used vocabulary: unsurprisingly, presidents often refer
to their own country, use words such as “country” (pais), and
“year” (ano), and the expected technical terms like “govern-
ment” (gobiern), “public,” “social, or “development” (desarroll).
Presidential positions in a latent issue space
We measure the revealed annual presidential positions on
the basis of the scaling model proposed in Slapin and Proksch
(2008).10 The model expresses the occurrence of terms in a
speech as a function of the political leaning of speakers and
the ideological meaning of employed terms. Since our speeches
cover an extended time period, changing or trending topics
may affect the estimation as the scaling model retrieves the
estimated positions on the basis of the word frequency only.
If certain topics appear in a very limited number of speeches
and the speaker tilts toward one side of the spectrum, the
algorithm may wrongly identify the rare words as strongly
separating between the end points of the one-dimensional
axis. To address this problem, we follow Proksch and Slapin
(2009) and use word stems that are mentioned in at least
20% of the documents.
The frequency of a term j in a document i is captured
with the word frequency matrix Yij. The observed counts are
the result of a probabilistic process and are therefore driven
by a stochastic component, on the one hand, and a systematic
component, on the other hand. To model the former one, we
follow Däubler and Benoit (2013) and Lo, Proksch, and Slapin
(2014) and express Yij as the result of a negative binomial
distribution.
Yij ∼ NegBin(mij, nj): ð1Þ
The exact shape of the probability distribution relies on the
two parameters mij and nj. The parameter nj captures hetero-
geneity.11 We let it vary according to
n ∼ Gamma(r), ð2Þ
where r is a parameter that determines the gamma distribu-
tion (Cameron and Trivedi 2013).10. For the growing literature on statistical approaches to measure con-
tent and preferences expressed in textv, see Grimmer and Stewart (2013),
Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003), Laver and Garry (2000), and Slapin and
Proksch (2008).
11. The parameter nj is of less theoretical concern in this application.
But see Lo et al. (2014) for an explicit treatment.
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the expected value E[yij] of our count matrix. The parameter
mij is a key component since it expresses the ﬁrst moment
of the probability distribution E½yijjmijnjp mij. We formu-
late the parameter mij as the result of a systematic component.
mij p exp(ai 1 wj 1 qi# bj): ð3Þ
Each document i has idiosyncratic characteristics that de-
termine the occurrence of a particular term ai. In a similar
vein, wj captures the idiosyncratic characteristic of each term
j. The key mechanics of the model is the interaction between
qi and bj. The parameter qi captures the value we are ulti-
mately interested in: the ideological position of a document
i. This position is weighted with the ideological leaning of
words bj.
We maximize the model for each country’s speeches in a
Bayesian framework, meaning we retrieve the most likely
values for the models’ stochastic and systematic parameters
given the observed frequencies Yij.12 Note that as a result the12. We identify our estimates by setting a1 p 0 (Däubler and Be-
noit 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008). Priors are uninformative with nj ∼
Gamma(0:02; 0:02) and for all other stochastic nodes Normal ∼ (0; 25). We
use parallel chains with overdispersed starting values until mixing between,
and convergence within, the chains reach acceptable levels. Once estimated,
we adapt the signs of each time series to sync the latent dimension with a
broadly perceived one-dimensional left-right space.
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as well as the ideological content of the terms. While we are
primarily interested in the ideological position of the speeches,
we retrieve the ideological value of the term i as a by-product
of the estimation process, too. For example, in Ecuador, we ﬁnd
among the 15 ideologically most relevant terms on the one
side of the spectrum the word stems ancestral, asambl, asesin,
companer, corazon, mentir, miseri, planet, prens, revolucion, rev-
olucionari, and victori—these are all terms a strongly left-
leaning speaker would typically use. On the other side, we
ﬁnd terms much more related to a liberal, conservative ideol-
ogy, such as aﬁanz, aprobacion, consorci, ejecutor, ferrocarril,
innfa, instalacion, previs, rios, socioeconom, and terminacion.
Figure 1 displays the resulting qi with a heatmap. Each
country’s time series reports standardized z-scores and prog-
resses from the earliest speech available in our sample on the
left to the most recent observation on the right. The shading
of the cells reﬂect the estimated ideal point; more negative
values are shown in darker shading, increasingly becoming
lighter with more positive values. Note that absolute posi-
tions can only be compared within a country. Cross-country
comparisons are only possible for presidential movements
because standardization per country expresses movements rel-
ative to the stretching of the respective main political dimension.
For example, a shift from a displayed position at 21 to 1 1
can be interpreted as a movement of two standard deviations
around the mean position of a country’s political spectrum.Table 1. State of the Union Addresses in Latin America: Countries, Time Periods, and Key CharacteristicsNumber of Words
in the AddressCountry Time Period Mean SD Top Eight Most Frequent Words (Median Relative Frequency)Argentina 1990–2014 4,521.12 2,952.11 argentin, hac, millon, nacional, pais, polit, social, trabaj
Brazil 1986–2014 1,650.76 1,103.93 brasil, congress, econom, govern, nacional, pais, polit, tod
Chile 1990–2013 7,792.38 2,521.46 ano, chil, chilen, gobiern, mejor, nuev, pais, trabaj
Colombia 1991–2013 3,159.83 1,108.43 colombi, congres, gobiern, nuev, pais, polit, segur, social
Costa Rica 1983–2013 4,292.48 1,594.09 cost, costarricens, desarroll, gobiern, mejor, nuev, pais, ric
Ecuador 1982–2012 5,964.21 1,788.69 ano, ecuador, ecuatorian, gobiern, millon, nacional, pais, polit
El Salvador 1995–2013 2,396.38 779.25 ano, desarroll, gobiern, nacional, nuev, pais, salvadoren, social
Guatemala 1999–2014 822.31 836.71 administracion, desarroll, gobiern, nacional, pais, polit, republ, social
Mexico 1989–2013 5,414.84 2,929.26 ano, gobiern, mexic, mexican, millon, nuev, pais, polit
Peru 1980–1991, 1996–2013 4,797.38 2,912.42 gobiern, millon, nacional, nuev, pais, peru, sol, trabaj
Paraguay 1992–2011 4,021.65 1,662.18 desarroll, gobiern, nacional, nuev, pais, paraguay, polit, social
Uruguay 2001–12 1,722.00 589.49 ano, gobiern, mism, nacional, pais, polit, public, uruguay
Venezuela 1987–93, 1995–99,
2001–12, 2014
9,955.52 7,387.21 ano, gobiern, hac, nacional, pais, social, venezolan, venezuelNote. We remove stopwords and consider wordstems only. The length of a speech is measured in words. For Peru, the period of Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup
has been excluded. Missing years for Venezuela indicate data restrictions/years for which the speeches were not available.254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 387Our estimates suggest that countries can be loosely grouped
into three broad categories. In some cases, presidents them-
selves tend to display similar and stable political views, but
we ﬁnd a remarkable difference between presidents. Execu-
tives in Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and also Venezuela
can be considered to fall into this category. For example, all
of the speeches of Colombia’s former president, Álvaro Uribe,
reveal policy positions that are quite consistently to the farThis content downloaded from 131.251.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms right. In Costa Rica, the ideal points of individual presidents
also tend to cluster, and the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela
is clearly distinct from all his predecessors. In contrast, in
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, the presidents’ movements ap-
pear to trend over time. While early presidents begin at one
end of the spectrum of the issue space, the more contempo-
rary executives display ideal points that are at the opposite end
of the spectrum. The remaining countries can be roughly sub-Figure 1. Posterior means for the latent ideal-points in 13 Latin American countries. Values are standardized, countrywise z-scores254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
15. It should be noted that these movements are comparable across
both time and space. First, any absolute anchor becomes obsolete because
it cancels out when calculating the difference between two ideal points.
Second, since we standardize the ideal points to z-scores within each
country, we take account of any stretching of the movements. We inter-
pret any movement as a movement relative to the overall issue space
within each country.
16. In Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, and
Uruguay, presidents made their ﬁnal state of the union address on the ﬁrst
day of the new legislature. For example, in Costa Rica, the president makes
her last address each year on May 1, which is also the day when the new
legislature takes their seats. As this often implies a change in the median
party while a president in this case is not addressing “her” legislature, this
last speech is therefore excluded from our analysis. We also exclude the
two extreme cases of Paraguay 1998 and Guatemala 2003 from further
analyses as these speeches were held in years of extreme national tensions.
In Paraguay, this was a post–coup attempt atmosphere; in Guatemala, the
backing of the ex-military ruler Montt as candidate by the incumbent
president led to intense violent conﬂicts and even a day of besiegement of
Guatemala City in July. As a robustness check, we also re-ran all models
without Venezuela after 2000. The results hold.
388 / Presidents and Compromise Christian Arnold, David Doyle, and Nina Wiesehomeiersumed into one last category. Here, incumbents differ in their
displayed attitudes, resulting in political systems with a high
mobility of presidents along the latent issue dimension.
Robustness and validation
We implement a series of robustness checks to validate our
results (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), all of which can be
found in the appendix, available online. First, a concern relates
to the identiﬁcation of the model. Presidents may tend to take
central positions in a unidimensional issue space or they may
occupy only parts of the overall issue space in a country. We
explore this possibility of truncation by identifying the model
with externally valid “anchors” based on positional data elic-
ited by the elite surveys of the PELA project (PELA 2005).
We use this information to ﬁx our model in the issue space,
correcting for the respondents’ individual scale and stretch
factors, as suggested by Aldrich and McKelvey (1977). The
differences are minor.
Second, when texts span a long range of time, changing
topics may affect the estimation of the ideal points. As pointed
out, we follow Proksch and Slapin (2009) and estimate all our
results with word stems that appear in at least 20% of the
texts, but as an additional test, we re-estimated our models
with word stems that appear in at least 30% and 40% of the
texts.13 Again, the differences are minor.
Third, it is difﬁcult to validate our results, given that no
comparable measures of executive policy positions across Latin
America over this time period are currently available. Wiese-
homeier and Benoit (2009) provide a cross section of ideology
scores for 18 executives based on an expert survey. The cor-
relation with our measure is 0.42 for 2006. Power and Zucco
(2014), in the last wave of the Brazilian Legislative Survey,
asked legislators to retrospectively assign a score to past Bra-
zilian presidents on the economic left-right dimension. This
is a single score per president and not a time series, but none-
theless, the correlation with our measure is 0.75.
Finally, and more signiﬁcantly, our estimates do seem to
be capturing some latent underlying left-right dimension. Ex-
isting work has shown that left-leaning governments across
Latin America are associated with higher levels of social spend-
ing relative to right and centrist administrations (Kaufman and
Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Pribble 2013). In a regression model
predicting variation in levels of social spending, our estimates
are statistically signiﬁcant at the .01 level.14 According to this13. Given that these particular estimates could be an artifact of topic
trending, we report the results for Chile, as an example, in the appendix.
14. These are estimated with country ﬁxed effects. Please see the ap-
pendix.
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predicted level of social spending of 11.81% of GDP. In con-
trast, our most left-leaning executive has a predicted level of
social spending of 13.57% of GDP.
THE MEDIAN PARTY, POLICY COMPROMISE,
AND LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS
With these estimated policy positions, we can now test our
theoretical propositions. The results of these tests can be found
in table 2. The dependent variable in each model in this table
is the degree of movement in the policy space. For each pres-
ident, we calculate the respective directional movements as
the difference between the position of a president at a point
in time t and her position in the previous period, t 2 1.15 This
allows us to calculate whether a president shifted to the left or
to the right, and to what extent, for each year of her term.16
Our main independent variable is change in the legisla-
tive median. We collect annual data for the composition of
the legislature for a date just prior to each state of the union
address.17 We then assign n_k legislators a party ideology
score on a 1–20 scale, where 1 is left and 20 right, based on
the expert survey data of Coppedge (1997), Pop-Eleches (2008),
and Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009); n represents the num-
ber of legislators for each party, k. Ordering the legislators in
each country from left to right, we then calculate the median17. Given that party switching is quite common in some Latin Ameri-
can countries, we contacted each country’s Library of Congress and requested
these data. We received this annual information for a number of countries,
but we did not receive any responses for the requested data from Argentina,
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela. For these countries, we collected the
data from election archives and various sources on the Internet. A full list of
all median parties, by year, can be found in the appendix.
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18. We also included a variety of economic controls, including in-
ﬂation, GDP growth, trade as a percentage of GDP, debt service as a
proportion of gross national income ,and participation in an IMF agree-
ment. The results remain unchanged.
Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 389party ideology score for each legislature and for each year.
We calculate any changes in the median as the difference in
the ideological score of the median party at a point in time t
and the position in the previous period, t 2 1.
To account for hypotheses 2–5, we include a measure
of the institutional power of the executive from Doyle and
Elgie (2016); the mean rate of public approval for a given
president in a particular year (from Carlin et al. 2014); a
proxy for targeted spending, general government ﬁnal con-
sumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which in-
cludes all government current expenditures for purchases of
goods and services, including compensation of employees
(which comes from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators); a dummy variable if a president is the ﬁrst year of
her term, to capture any honeymoon effect (see also CalvoThis content downloaded from 131.251.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms 2007; Figueiredo et al. 2011); and ﬁnally, a series of separate
dummies for government type, single party minority and
majority or minority coalition (based on data from theWorld
Bank Dataset on Political Institutions, updated in January
2013; Beck et al. 2001).18 Given the expected conditioning ef-
fect of these variables, we interact each one with the change in
the policy position of the median party.
As we can see frommodel 1 in table 2, there is a very strong
relationship between the ideological score of the median
party and the position of the president. When the medianTable 2. The Incentives for Executive Movement(1) (2)254.0
and C(3)61 on Decem
onditions (ht(4)ber 15, 2017 
tp://www.jour(5)07:38:38 AM
nals.uchicag(6)o.edu/t-and-(7)Median party position .152**
(.02)D Median party position 2.078* 2.034 .114 .009 .442* 2.078*
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.18) (.20) (.04)Policy positiont21 2.073*
(.03)D Party position # Positiont21 .038
(.03)Presidential power 2.470
(.28)D Party position # Presidential power 2.333**
(.10)Presidential approval 2.001
(.00)D Party position # Approval 2.001
(.00)Administrative spending .004
(.02)D Party position # Spending 2.039*
(.02)Honeymoon 2.004
(.07)D Party position # Honeymoon .000
(.07)Constant 21.682** 2.032 2.047 .199 .049 2.120 2.031
(.32) (.06) (.06) (.15) (.19) (.21) (.06)N 261 189 189 189 123 189 189
R2 .129 .127 .157 .147 .163 .158 .127Note. All models are estimated with country ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.c).
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Looking into the dynamics of this relationship, however,
the results do not completely conﬁrm our expectations. In
fact, according to model 2, when the median party changes,
then, all else equal, the president appears to move in the
opposite ideological direction. When, in a ﬁrst step, we ex-
plore this effect inductively by interacting our main inde-
pendent variable with the policy position of the president
at time t2 1 (model 3), it appears that it is driven primarily
by presidents on the left. Unsurprisingly, centrist presidents
are most attuned to changes in the legislature; when the me-
dian party shifts left or right, so too do presidents in the
center.19 This ﬂexibility echoes arguments in the literature that
centrist presidents may be able to achieve policy outcomes
without entering formal cabinet coalitions (see Alemán and
Tsebelis 2011), while more extreme presidents tend not to
foster coalitions (see Amorim Neto 2006).
More important, however, ﬁgure 2 displays, from the top-
left andmoving counter-clockwise, the conditioning effect of
presidential power, targeted spending, honeymoon periods,
and presidential approval, respectively. As the top-left pane
shows, with an unfavorable balance of power, executives in
Latin America are willing to respond to dynamics within the
house. When the position of the median party changes to the
left or to the right, so too does that of the president. This
makes sense as weak presidents will have no other option but
to legislate through the house, and so they will be more at-
tuned to dynamics among legislative parties. Strong presi-
dents, however, appear to have no such compulsion. The
effect of presidential power is statistically signiﬁcant for shifts
of the median party both to the left and to the right. Echoing
long-standing concerns regarding strong presidencies (Shu-
gart and Carey 1992), these results suggest a proclivity toward
conﬂict when the president has recourse to signiﬁcant insti-
tutional power in the context of changes of the legislative me-
dian away from the president’s position (see also Martínez-
Gallardo 2011).
Targeted spending, as expected, also appears to condition
the executive’s willingness to compromise her position. At
high levels of spending, the president is no longer responsive
to changes in the house, indicating that, as suggested by Raile
et al. (2010), targeted spending does offset the need for
ideological compromise. In contrast, at low levels of spend-
ing, presidents are quite responsive to the house, and when
the median party shifts to the left or to the right, so too does
the president. Honeymoon periods exert a similar effect, al-19. The marginal effects of models 2 and 3 can be found in the ap-
pendix.
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in cases where the median party changes to the right. In this
scenario, however, the honeymoon period appears to facil-
itate a less consensual approach from the president. Finally,
varying levels of popular approval do not appear to have any
notable effect.
To probe the effect of different levels of assembly support,
we also interacted changes in the position of the median
party with a dummy variable for each of the three relevant
government types.20 The results of these models are dis-
played in ﬁgure 3. As we may expect, when the president’s
coalition commands a majority in the assembly, we do not
observe any signiﬁcant or notable change in the position of
the president. In contrast, presidents in a minority situation,
particularly presidents relying on a minority coalition, are
more likely to adopt a conﬂictual stance with the house.
When the house moves left, the president moves right, and
vice versa.
Since we might expect minority presidents to actually
anticipate the legislature and be willing to bargain with the
house in order to build a majority on an issue-by-issue basis
and get legislation passed (Alemán and Tsebelis 2011; Chei-
bub et al. 2004; Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Negretto 2006),
at a ﬁrst glance, this result appears counterintuitive. Yet, as
we have argued, the institutional and political capacity of the
executive will shape the strategies they employ. Splitting the
sample at the median level of executive power is thus illu-
minating.21 The seemingly counterintuitive result we observe
for minority presidents is entirely driven by strong presidents.
There are no cases of weak presidents commanding minority
coalitions, and for single party minority presidents with low
levels of institutional power, the effect disappears. It would
appear then that minority presidents with high levels of for-
mal executive authority prefer to adopt an imperial strategy
using unilateral action to pass legislation and to relate “to
congress more as English monarchs used to relate to their
parliaments” (Cox and Morgenstern 2001, 182). This ﬁnding
not only reﬂects work warning of the substitutability of par-
tisan support in presidential systems with high levels of ex-
ecutive prerogatives, but it is also consistent with prior work
on presidential coalition formation behavior, which has ar-
gued that high levels of executive power decrease presidential
incentives to form coalitions (see Alemán and Tsebelis 2011).
Our analysis of the factors that might mediate presiden-
tial policy compromise has highlighted that presidents en-
gage to differing degrees in positional movement in the pol-20. We did not include single-party majority, as by deﬁnition under
this scenario the median would remain the same.
21. These results can be found in the appendix.
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they operate. The basic assumption underlying this analysis
is that, in general, if the president does not have recourse to
institutional power or large amounts of funds for targeted
spending, then she must compromise and work with the as-
sembly to implement policy. We should therefore expect to
observe that presidents who move in response to changes in
the house will have a higher rate of statutory legislative suc-
cess in comparison to those that do not. That is, there will
be some pay-off for responding to changes in the median
party. Table 3 presents some evidence that this appears to be
the case. As they cover slightly different time periods, we use
two different dependent variables in this analysis: in mod-
els 1–4, we use the percentage of executive-initiated statutory
bills passed by the lower house of the national legislature from
Saiegh (2011), and in models 5–8, we use a similar measure
taken from Montero (2009).22 It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that due to data availability, our number of cases drops
dramatically. Our main independent variable is a dummy var-22. We would like to thank Sebastián M. Saiegh and Mercedes García
Montero for generously agreeing to share their data with us.
This content downloaded from 131.251.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms iable coded as 1 if the president moves in the same direction as
the median party when the median party changes, and 0 oth-
erwise. When a president responds to dynamics in the house,
then her rate of legislative success jumps. In otherwords, when
the house moves left, and a president moves left also, then the
rate of legislative success increases. In fact, whether a president
chooses to respond to dynamics in the house or ignore any
changes corresponds to a difference in their predicted rate
of legislative success of approximately 6%. Taken as a whole,
therefore, these results suggest that positional compromise
on the part of presidents can be an integral part of their leg-
islative strategy.
CONCLUSION
The relative dangers of presidentialism as a form of govern-
ment have long inspired debate (Bagehot [1867] 1964; Linz
1990; Stepan and Skach 1993). More recently, a revisionist
comparative literature has challenged the assertion that pres-
identialismismoreprone to legislativedeadlockandexecutive-
legislative conﬂict than other systems of government (e.g.,
Cheibub 2007; Cheibub et al. 2004; Negretto 2006). The core
conclusion of this work suggests that presidents are far moreFigure 2. Conditioning effects on presidential compromise254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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tially thought. However, to date—and to the best of our
knowledge—no extant study has attempted to explore the
conditions under which presidents will signal this willing-
ness and whether this indeed results in an improved legis-
lative track record. We remedy this situation in two impor-
tant ways.
First, we overcome previous empirical obstacles that pre-
vented an analysis of these dynamics. Using annual state of
the union addresses, we generate the ﬁrst cross-national time-
series data on revealed positions, and relative movement, of
73 Latin American presidents between 1980 and 2014. This
not only adds to the literature that attempts to measure the
policy positions of political actors across Latin America (Cop-
pedge 1997; Micozzi and Kikuchi 2015; PELA 2005; Power
and Zucco 2009; Saiegh 2009b; Wiesehomeier and Benoit
2009), but more importantly it demonstrates the utility of
speech data as a means of deriving ex post positions of Latin
American political actors. We believe these data will be aThis content downloaded from 131.251.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms valuable resource for comparative scholarship of Latin Amer-
ican politics.
Second, we contribute to the wider comparative litera-
ture on executive-legislative relations. These data allow us to
establish when and to what degree a president will engage in
positional compromise with the assembly during the course
of her term. Speciﬁcally, what we demonstrate is that presi-
dents will only compromise with the house when they are
unable to draw on institutional powers or to build legislative
coalitions with pork and targeted transfers. When the exec-
utives have recourse to these prerogatives, presidents ac-
tually tend to be more hostile than consensual toward the
assembly. This pattern is particularly pronounced in minor-
ity government situations.
Our results thus further qualify our understanding of the
dynamics in presidential systems. They suggest that the Lin-
zian interpretation of presidentialism is probably too pessi-
mistic. Presidents in Latin America are not always the in-
ﬂexible and imperial leaders previously characterized by Linz.Figure 3. The conditional effect of government type254.061 on December 15, 2017 07:38:38 AM
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they can be. In particular, our ﬁndings that pertain to the an-
tagonistic nature of strong presidents in minority situations
conﬁrm previous work on the impact of institutional design
on the performance of presidential regimes (Mainwaring and
Shugart 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992). In other words, in-
stitutional variation among separation of power systems will
condition the degree of harmony between the executive and
legislative branches.
The ﬂip side of the coin is, of course, that presidents are
willing to compromise given the right institutional incen-
tives. Our results show that a president can inﬂuence the
interbranch relationship with signals of policy compromise
and that when a president assumes ofﬁce, in addition to the
formal legislative tools at her disposal, she can also make use
of a number of “efﬁcient secrets” that can help manage her
relationship with the house and ensure the success of her
statutory legislative agenda (see, e.g., Figueiredo and Limongi
2000; Mejía Acosta 2009). Our results on policy compromise
are indicative of this interbranch legislative dynamic that helps
the president to build and maintain coalitions and to pass
legislation in the house.
Institutional incentives are thus crucial for governance
(Saiegh 2009a) in separation of powers systems, and it is
important for how we might design constitutions in such
systems to mitigate interbranch conﬂict and facilitate law-This content downloaded from 131.251.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms making. Of course, given that a president is directly elected,
such policy shifts may undermine the quality of representa-
tion. In many Latin American democracies, faith in political
institutions is already at a low point, and if executives engage
in wide-ranging policy shifts in response to incentives in the
assembly, then suchmoral hazard in the principal-agent chain
will further erode the popular legitimacy of the political sys-
tem (see Strøm, Müller, and Bergman2003). This is probably
where some sort of trade-off exists between representation
and effective governance. However, given the low number of
observations for the executive’s rate of legislative success,
future research should delve in more detail into more case-
speciﬁc conditions and aim at disentangling the incentives for
presidents to signal a willingness to compromise on some
issues but not on others.
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